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2Abstract
This paper investigates differences across UK universities in
1993 life sciences students’ degree performance using individual-
level data from the Universities’ Statistical Record (USR). Dif-
ferences across universities are analysed by specifying and esti-
mating a subject-specific educational production function. Even
after including a wide range of controls for the quality of stu-
dents, significant differences emerge across universities in stu-
dents’ degree performance. We apply a two-stage estimation
procedure and find evidence that a large part of ‘university ef-
fects’ cannot be explained by the kind of institutional inputs
commonly used in the literature on school quality. Finally, we
compare the unadjusted ranking of universities based on the
proportion of ‘good’ (first and upper second class honours) de-
grees awarded with that based on the estimated probability of
a ‘good’ degree obtained from the microeconometric model and
find significant differences between the two indicators of univer-
sities’ performance.
JEL classification numbers : I21 J24.
Keywords : educational economics, input-output analysis, or-
dered probit, performance indicators, value-added.
31 Introduction
The rapid increase in the number of higher education (HE) institutions
in the UK, their significant dependence on public funding and the con-
sequent need to allocate scarce public resources efficiently, has led to
public concern regarding the ‘accountability’ of such institutions and to
the development of performance indicators (PIs) for higher education in-
stitutions.
The aims of building PIs in higher education include both the ‘account-
ability’ of the UK university system and the development of legitimate
‘league tables’ or rankings of universities against various criteria. Despite
the existence of several institutions collecting data on the UK university
system1, a new organisation, the Performance Indicators Steering Group
(PISG) was established in 1997 with the primary aim of constructing PIs2.
The PISG in its first report set the criteria for the construction of PIs,
which emphasised the policy and managerial requirements of government
and funding councils. PIs were also meant to fulfill the needs of prospec-
tive students and their advisers. In fact, it is likely that given the rising
proportion of funding derived from students’ fees, consumer demand will
have a greater role in the allocation of resources across universities, and
prospective students and their advisers will require greater information
to compare the performance of different institutions.
Jarrat (1985:53) divided PIs into internal performance indicators in-
cluding access, progression and degree outcomes of students, external per-
formance indicators including employability of graduates and the research
record and operational performance indicators which relate to the activi-
ties of individual departments. PIs were similarly classified by the PISG
(HEFCE 1999:6) that elaborated PIs related to: participation of under-
1Among the others the Higher Education Management Statistics Group (HEMS), publishing statis-
tics at both the sector and the institution level and the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA)
collecting and publishing data on students, staff composition and expenditures for the UK university
system.
2The first report of the PISG (HEFCE 1999:7) stated: ‘The working group took note of its task
to find measures of performance rather than descriptive statistics’.
4represented groups, student progression, learning outcomes (including
non-completion), efficiency of learning and teaching, student employment,
research output, HE links with industry.
The performance indicators developed by the PISG build on the set
of PIs suggested in the influential book of Johnes & Taylor (1990). The
common feature of both the Johnes & Taylor’s and the PISG’s PIs is
the attention placed on the quality of the student intake (i.e. ‘the need
to compare like-with-like’) neglected by simple ‘league tables’ reporting
performance-related descriptive statistics without taking account of con-
textual differences across institutions. Another common characteristic is
the use of data aggregated across institutions.
The comparison of aggregate data by institution taking account of
the average quality of students enrolled represents substantial progress
with respect to published ‘league tables’ based on raw (unadjusted) data.
However, simply considering the average characteristics of the students
enrolled at a specific university can obscure the effect of differences in the
distribution of student quality and suffer from aggregation bias, compared
to analyses which exploit individual student-level data.
Being aware of the potential bias introduced by aggregation, some
researchers exploited individual-level data from the Universities’ Statisti-
cal Record, to address specific issues concerning the UK university sys-
tem. McNabb, Pal & Sloane (1998) studied gender differences in degree
performance of 1992 university leavers from English and Welsh univer-
sities. Smith and Naylor (2000) analysed the degree performance of the
1993 cohort of university leavers focusing on gender differences and differ-
ences by type of secondary school attended. Smith, McKnight & Naylor
(2000) built PIs related to students’ employability for UK universities
using individual-level 1993 USR data. Finally, Smith and Naylor (2001)
investigated student drop-out decisions and developed a related PI from
USR data. Drawing upon this body of research we exploit individual-
level data from the USR in order to address a particular issue relating to
Higher Education PIs: we investigate differences across ‘old’ UK universi-
5ties3 in 1993 life sciences students’ degree performance. We will motivate
the particular choice of this cohort of students and of the subject in sec-
tion 3. Two major differences with respect to the two previous studies of
degree performance cited above are:
1. The adoption of a subject-specific approach and the use of new con-
trols for previous educational qualifications that are likely to mitigate
the problem of the non-random selection of students across univer-
sities;
2. The use of university dummies (and a two-stage estimation proce-
dure) rather than university inputs in the degree performance equa-
tion that, as we will see, helps to obtain consistent estimates of the
covariates of interest.
The study of the differences across universities in students’ degree per-
formance is an interesting issue for several reasons. Differences in degree
performance across universities that remain after controlling for individual
characteristics of students can be considered as a measure of the ‘value-
added’ produced by universities and of the effectiveness of the teaching
process. If, however, differences across universities in students’ degree
performance are completely partialled out once one takes account of the
quality of students, one can conclude that universities with better results
in terms of degree classes awarded are simply selecting better prospective
students, and that differences in the quantity and quality of university re-
sources are not important for students’ learning outcomes. This evidently
has strong consequences in terms of public policy. For example, if funds
are allowed on the basis of the proportion of ‘good’4 degrees awarded it
would happen that the most selective or ‘elitest’ universities would re-
ceive more funds simply because they select better prospective students
even if they do not produce any value-added. Only appropriate statisti-
3The universities established prior to the abolition of the binary divide (between universities and
polytechnics) in 1992.
4In analogy with the previous literature, in this paper with a ‘good’ degree we mean a first class
or an upper second class honours degree.
6cal modeling can explore this question properly. The analysis of degree
performance is important not only to government and funding bodies to
have an idea of the ‘value-added’ produced by universities, but also to
prospective students: not least given the substantial economic return to
a ‘good’ degree performance. Dolton & Makepeace (1990) observe that
starting salaries are higher for graduates with a ‘good’ degree result and
Smith et al. (2000) find that a ‘good’ degree performance substantially
reduces the probability of unemployment and inactivity. Last, but not
least, universities themselves are interested in the factors determining a
‘good’ degree performance for several reasons: for example, for student
admission policy or to improve the effectiveness of teaching5 .
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we in-
troduce an ‘economic’ model of degree performance, which represents a
useful framework for the specification of an educational production func-
tion and for the interpretation of empirical results. In section 3, we spec-
ify the educational production function. In section 4, we describe data
and variables used in the analysis and discuss the problem of the non-
random selection of students across universities. Section 5 reports the
results of inter-university comparisons obtained when applying different
performance indicators. Section 6 concludes.
2 An ‘economic model’ of degree performance
Research on educational outcomes can be distinguished into two main
bodies. The first treats schooling as something that is done to students,
as in the economic literature based on the educational production func-
tion, i.e. the input-output techniques reviewed by Monk (1990). The
second focuses on student learning, as in the psychological literature, and
typically avoids generalisations across students. In their book, Johnes
5The PISG (HEFCE 1999) stated: ‘The immediate priority is to publish institutional-level indica-
tors for teaching and research’ (p.11) and ‘Institutions need to be able to identify entrants with the
potential to benefit from higher education, and then to provide the support necessary to maximise
their chances of success’ (p.16).
7& Taylor (1990) adopt the first approach, where students are the ‘raw
material’ that universities transform into the final output. A legitimate
comparison between universities should compare the ‘like-with-like’ and
therefore needs to take account of the quality of the ‘raw material’ used
(students). This is probably a very extreme representation of the educa-
tional process since students are given a completely passive role. We will
see in what follows that a more complete economic model of the demand
for higher education can offer better insights not only for the empirical
specification of educational production functions but also for the inter-
pretation of empirical results6.
We consider here a simple model of demand for education. We assume
that the individual decides whether to enroll at university and how to
allocate her time between alternative activities and that she has a life-
time utility function given by:
U =
T∑
t=1
βtut(st, ht, ct) (1)
where β = 1
1+r
is the discount factor, with r > 0. ut are period felicity
functions, st leisure time, ht is the time devoted to study (i.e. study effort)
and ct consumption. At this level of the analysis we assume that there
exists only one type of tertiary education. The utility function accounts
also for the consumption motive of education: individuals may study not
only because education produces an economic return but also because
they like studying and the consequent cultural enrichment.
Individuals are subject to constraints in each period. They have time
constraints:
m = st + ht + lt t = 1, ...T (2)
where m is the time available each period and lt the time spent working;
6Monk (1990) for example observes that several home and background variables have been included
among the inputs into educational production functions without a strong theoretical rationale for
their importance (p. 324). The idea of considering the educational production function as a part of
a broader utility maximisation problem is also present in McGuckin & Winker (1979).
8and budget constraints:
ct = A+ wPt−1lt t = 1, ...T (3)
where we have adopted the hypothesis of ‘perfectly imperfect capital mar-
kets’ (PICM), i.e. individuals must balance their budget each period. A is
the amount of exogenous income (due for example to family transfers) and
is equal in every period by assumption. wPt−1 is the salary depending on
the economic return to educational performance (w) and the educational
performance in the previous period (Pt−1). Past educational performance
raises the opportunity cost of studying for current students because the
market value of the time spent studying is higher, but at the same time
it is an input into the current educational performance function7:
Pt = f(ht, It, Pt−1, a) + t (4)
where Pt is the educational performance at time t, It are institutional
inputs reflecting the ‘quality’ of the educational institution and a the
innate ability or intelligence of the student, which we assume does not
vary over time. This formulation relates to the ‘value-added’ approach8
where the researcher is interested in the contribution of the factors on the
RHS of equation (4) controlling for past educational achievement9 (i.e. in
students’ progress). We assume that performance is assessed at the end
of each period and that it is uncertain. Uncertainty enters the problem
through an additive stochastic term t.
The problem of the individual is to maximise the expected value of
(1) with respect to the choice variables st, lt, ht and ct subject to the
time and budget constraints. Assuming well behaved functional forms, a
demand for education (or study effort) can be obtained as a function of
the exogenous variables:
ht = g(A, r, e, w, It, Pt−1, a) (5)
7We use the expressions ‘educational production function’ and ‘educational performance function’
exchangeably.
8See for example Bowles (1971) and Hanushek (1979).
9For an application of the ‘value-added’ approach to the study of students’ performance at sec-
ondary school see O’Donoghue, Thomas, Goldstein & Knight (1996).
9where e denotes the ‘taste for education’ and represents the parameters
of the utility function driving the consumer demand for education. Of
course, past educational performance depends on past inputs into the
educational performance function. Substituting the demand for effort
into the educational performance function we have:
Pt = f(g(A, r, e, w, It, Pt−1, a), It, Pt−1, a) + t. (6)
When we move from the theoretical model to the empirical specification
we seldom have information on the effort input (ht). Therefore we are
not able to estimate a ‘structural production function’, i.e. equation (4)
representing a technical relationship between inputs and outputs into ed-
ucation. We can only estimate the ‘reduced form’ (6) where the technical
coefficients of the production function f are mixed with those of the ‘de-
mand for study effort’, i.e. function g. This means that among the inputs
we do not observe the input of effort but we can estimate nevertheless the
effect of the ‘first determinants’ of the demand for study effort, assuming
that we can observe all the exogenous variables of the model. A com-
plete model of educational investment helps also to interpret the effects
of some factors that are often found significant in estimates of educa-
tional performance functions, such as social class or gender, whose main
role may be to differentiate the input of effort (i.e. to affect ht as a re-
sult of differences in tastes, exogenous income or in the economic return
to university education) and that have often been interpreted instead as
technical coefficients for factors which directly affect performance10 (i.e.
factors not entering (4) through ht). Another advantage of this approach
is to underline the central role of the student in the educational process,
which has been largely advocated in the literature11.
10For example biological differences have been advocated to explain gender differences in school
performance.
11Monk (1990:315) observes that ‘student time and effort are central ingredients in education pro-
duction’, Levin (1993) focuses on the role of students as workers doing the production and not as
the raw material processed by educational institutions. Shanahan, Findlay, Cowie, Round, McIver &
Barrett (1997) underline the need for a better link between the teaching and the learning side of the
educational process, the first stressed by the input-output literature, the second by the psychological
10
The empirical strategy we follow seeks to include among the covariates
into the educational performance function variables reflecting heterogene-
ity in exogenous income, ‘taste for education’, past educational perfor-
mance, innate ability, institutional effects and the return to educational
performance. An implication of the reduced form approach is that since
each variable can influence the educational performance through several
channels we are not able to disentangle the separate effects. For example
if the social class is a proxy for exogenous income A, and therefore for
the tightness of the budget constraint, but it also influences the economic
return to educational performance (e.g. through ‘social networks’ univer-
sity students from higher social classes have access to better jobs), we are
only able to estimate the overall effect and not the two separate effects.
3 The econometric model
In the theoretical analysis of section 2 we can abandon the hypothesis
of homogeneity of education and assume that individuals can choose the
subject (i) of study and the institution (j) where to enroll. In this case
the educational performance function is:
P ijt = f
ij(g(A, r, e, w, I ijt , Pt−1, a), I
ij
t , Pt−1, a) + t. (7)
The degree performance function becomes subject and institutional spe-
cific. Now the subject and the educational institution (i.e. I ijt ) are choice
variables for the individual. We consider a restrictive version of equation
(7), by assuming linearity of f ij and that the impact of the institution is
independent of the characteristics of the student12, i.e. there is a subject
institutional-specific effect which adds to the effects of the other variables
and which can be considered as the ‘value-added’ of the i institution in
literature.
12In a linear specification this is equivalent to assuming that institutions are not differentially
effective on students with different characteristics.
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the j subject:
P ijt = β0 + β1A+ β2 r + β3 e
+ β4w +
∑
z
β5zP
zk
t−1 + β6 a+ β7 I
ij + t. (8)
Where z are the subjects studied at the secondary school and k the sec-
ondary school attended. This is the formulation derived from the theo-
retical analysis. Unfortunately, we do not have data on all the variables
appearing on the RHS of equation (8) and some of them have to be prox-
ied.
Although the PISG (HEFCE, 1999:16) in its report does not recom-
mend subject splits of PIs ‘to keep the number of indicators small enough
to be digested’, both intuition and the empirical evidence suggest the pres-
ence of differences across subjects in the impact of the covariates included
on the RHS of (8) on degree performance. It is natural to think that the
impact of a specific type of previous education on degree performance
may vary across subjects, e.g. the effect of an A-level13 in mathematics is
probably different if a student engages in the study of mathematics rather
than in the study of literature at university, or the university effect can
be different across subjects, given that the quality of departments may
vary within the same university.14. Also the empirical evidence drawn
from previous work support the presence of differences across subjects.
Early work by Nevin (1972) showed that the proportion of ‘good’ degrees
awarded varies by subject within the same university. Chapman (1996),
for example, find that the impact of previous entry qualifications is very
different across subjects and that the proportion of variability in good
13Compulsory education in Britain ends at age 16. Students wishing to enroll at university must
complete two further years of studies and take the General Certificate of Education ‘Advanced’ Level
(G.C.E. A-level). Success at two or more A-levels generally qualifies them for university entry. The
equivalent examinations for Scotland and Northern Ireland are Scottish and Irish Higher respectively
(see Pissarides, 1982).
14Furthermore, departments rather than universities are often directly responsible for the admission
policy. Since different departments within the same university may apply different admission criteria,
we explain in the following section how the adoption of a subject-specific approach is likely to alleviate
the problem of the non-random assignment of students to universities.
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degrees explained by entry qualifications ranges from 5.3% for politics
to 23.5% for mathematics. Clarke (1988), studying gender differences in
degree performance, find that the relative under-achievement of females
at first class degrees and the general worse performance of males both
are less evident at the subject specific than at the aggregate level. Smith
and Naylor (2000) find that the effect of having attended an independent
school on degree performance varies across subjects. For these reasons we
decide to focus our attention on a specific subject. Our choice falls on
life sciences. It is one of the most popular subjects of study at university
in the UK and has a rather well-balanced gender composition. Further-
more, it is a subject field which has been at the centre of much recent
public policy discussion. This has focused on the question of the quality
of undergraduate life sciences students proceeding to post-graduate study.
Clearly the determinants of degree performance are relevant to this. We
use the 1993 cohort of university leavers, the same cohort used in Smith
et al. (2000)15.
4 Data and variables
Data for the analysis comes from the Universities’ Statistical Record
(USR). The USR was the institution in charge of the collection of the
statistical returns from all university institutions in Great Britain which
formerly received Exchequer grants from the University Funding Council
(UFC), together with corresponding institutions for the Queen’s Univer-
sity of Belfast and the University of Ulster. The USR has stored data
from the academic year 1972/1973 until 1993/1994 when it was replaced
by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). The USR data is rich
in information concerning the academic life and prior educational qual-
ifications of students and includes the entire cohorts of students leaving
university each year.
In this paper, we consider students enrolled in life sciences (LS) courses.
15And the last cohort available from the USR.
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This means that the analysis is to be considered as conditional on the in-
dividual having chosen to enroll in a LS course. We do not address the
issue of selection of individuals across subjects. If we adopt an optimis-
ing framework the fact that the individual has enrolled in a LS course
means that this is the course which maximises her utility taking account
of several individual, family, social and local factors16.
Another complication with respect to the simple theoretical model of
section 3 arises from the fact that the individual has only a limited control
on the choice of university (I ijt in the model). In fact, prospective UK
tertiary students generally apply to more than one university. In the case
that they receive more than one acceptation they decide which university
to enroll at. Admission is determined by universities on the basis of several
criteria, such as prior educational qualifications, letter of references from
previous educational institutions attended, personal interviews, etc. ‘Top
ranked’ universities apply more selective criteria of admission and gener-
ally have a better quality of student intake. This means, for example, that
students with different prior qualifications are not randomly sorted across
universities. Since the main focus of the paper is on the assessment of the
importance of institutional effects for students’ degree performance, we
have a primary concern on the consistency of the estimates of university
effects. Unfortunately, since the assignment of students to universities
is non-random, the estimates of the university effects are inconsistent if
we fail to take account of the selection mechanism. The selection mecha-
nism consists of three stages. At the first stage the individual chooses the
universities she wishes to apply to. This first stage of the selection can
be ignored at the moment, since the same factors affecting it enter the
selection mechanism later. At the second stage universities make their
admission choice. This is generally based on prior educational qualifica-
tions of students. Other observable characteristics may affect the decision,
such as the type of secondary school attended (state school, independent
16For an econometric model of college major choice see for example Berger (1988) and Montmar-
quette, Cannings & Mahseredjian (1997).
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school, etc.) or social class17. We can control for these characteristics by
including the related covariates in the RHS of the performance equation.
The decision of the admission officers may also be affected by other stu-
dents’ attributes, such as a subjective assessment of motivation, or the
performance at interview, which are unobservable to the econometrician.
However, common sense suggests that these characteristics, since they are
unobservable or based on subjective evaluations, should be of minor im-
portance for the decision and be only marginally relevant18 (for example
between students with the same observed characteristics).
Once the student is offered a place she decides the which institution
to enroll at. At this stage the same factors affecting the first stage re-
enter the selection mechanism. We may think that the decision is based
on some observable factors such as prior educational qualifications, e.g.
the individual enrolls in the most selective institution among those where
she has been accepted (i.e. that with the highest entry qualifications),
or distance from home (i.e. residence), but also on some unobserved
factors, such as the preference of the individual for the city where the
university is located or the idiosyncratic preference for a certain university.
As observed by Barnow, Cain & Goldberger (1981) unbiasedness, in the
estimation of institutional effects in this specific case, is attainable only
when the variables driving the selection rule are known, quantified and
included in the regression equation. The richness of the USR allows the
analyst to include almost all the observable variables which are likely to
determine the assignment rule. There are only few variables left, mainly
truly unobservable variables that we can reasonably think to have only
a minor role in determining the assignment rule19, to be sufficiently well
17These factors are found significant by Collier & Mayer (1986) in their estimation of an ‘admission
function’ for students applying at Oxford University.
18E.g. the student with poor secondary school qualifications but highly motivated would have the
burden of justifying his/her past low performance and of persuading admission officers of his/her high
learning potential.
19In this regard the ‘admission function’ for the Oxford University applicants estimated by Collier
& Mayer (1986) including observable variables such as A-levels total score, marks in some specific
A-level examinations, type of school and social class, performs quite well in terms of fit.
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proxied by the observed variables affecting selection20 or not to affect
degree performance.
Among the individual information available about students leaving
universities there is the class of degree awarded. In the UK the degree
classification relies on the aggregate percentage of educational credits ac-
cumulated during the academic life, even if academic results in the final
year of study are generally more heavily weighted. In general the intervals
adopted for degree classification are for the highest degree classes: First
Class Honours (70% or above), Upper Second Class Honours (60%-69%);
Lower Second Class (50%-59%); Third Class Honours (40%-49%).
We aggregate the degree classes in five groups, listed from the lowest
to the highest class21:
1. fail: failure in the final year of study or drop out for academic reasons;
2. other degree: includes pass degrees, aegrotat degrees, unclassified
honours degrees, Fourth class honours degrees, Third class honours
degrees and other degree qualifications;
3. Lower Second class honours degree and Undivided Second class hon-
ours degrees;
4. Upper Second class honours degree;
5. First class honours degree
20It is the assumption adopted by the proxying and matching method, see Blundell, Dearden,
Goodman & Reed (1997). A similar approach is followed by Monk (2000) in his analysis of the return
to college characteristics. A model of selection on observable and unobservable variables is considered
by Dale & Krueger (1999) who estimate the return to attending a more selective college. They use
information on the set of colleges at which students were accepted and rejected to remove the effect
of unobserved characteristics. Unfortunately at present similar information is not readily available
for UK university applicants.
21The main aggregation applies to degree classes lower than the Second class. This is mainly
because there are marked differences across institutions in the tendency to award specific classes of
degree lower than a Second class honours degree. These classes of degree are awarded anyway to
only the 4.73% of 1993 life sciences university leavers. As observed by McNabb et al. (1998) two
shortcomings of this measure are the comparability of degree results across universities, potentially
ensured by the system of external examiners which has, however, been questioned in recent years (see
Silver, Stennett & Williams, 1995), and the fact that degree classes are broadly defined.
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Let us assume that educational credits (P ∗) are obtained according to the
following equation:
P ∗s = αIj + βXs + s (9)
where the Ij are university effects, Xs students’ characteristics and s is
the subscript for students. We do not observe the amount of educational
credits obtained but only the final degree classification, which is a discrete
variable. A possible way to account for the ordered discrete nature of
the outcome variable is to model the degree performance equation as an
ordered probit22.
The variables included in the analysis can be distinguished into per-
sonal characteristics, family and social background, prior educational qual-
ifications, university effects.
Personal characteristics
Gender and marital status: are included since males and females may
have a different taste for specific subjects or different rates of return to
various types of education and have therefore different levels of study
effort. Married students may have a tighter time constraint and the effect
may be different for males and females due to the existence of a society
gender role model (single female students are the reference group).
Age group dummies: are included to proxy for different levels of ma-
turity of students. Maturity may affect the input of effort and the degree
performance. In general it is observed that performance increases with
age (see for example Hoskins, Newstead & Dennis 1997 and McNabb et
al. 1998). We consider four age groups: <24 (base group), 24-27, 28-33,
≥34.
Academic variables
Transferred students. We include a dummy for the individuals who
transferred to another university during the course to control for the effect
of changing the learning environment (non-transferred students are the
reference group);
22For some technical notes see Maddala (1983:46-49).
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‘Home’ students. We include a dummy for students who remained
at the parental address for the full duration of the course. Different
speculations are possible for the sign of the effect of this variable: students
at home may be engaged in extra-curricular activities (mainly domestic
duties) and perform relatively worse than ‘non-home’ students. But the
same argument may be used to justify an eventual lower performance
of students living in university residences, who may have a more intense
‘social life’ (‘non-home’ students are the reference group).
University dummies are included to pick up the additive university
effect described in section 3 (university 11 is the reference group).
Prior educational qualifications. We include a wide range of controls
for prior educational qualifications most of which have been omitted in
previous studies:
(i) aslscore: the individual student’s score in the best three A-levels
or AS-levels obtained (out of 30)23. It is a measure of secondary school
examination results that we interpret as an ability indicator. In fact,
since the individual has a time constraint in the allocation of study effort
across different subjects and that she may have a different taste for the
study of different subjects, if she obtains good results in a high number
of subjects studied she can reasonably be considered as relatively more
able. The score is computed as follows: A=10 points, B=8 points, C=6
points, D=4 points, E=2 points for A-levels, A=5 points, B=4 points,
C=3 points, D=2 points, E=1 point for AS-level24;
(ii) hlescore: score in the best five Scottish Highers obtained (out of
15). It is a control for the ability of the student. It is computed as follows:
A=3 points, B=2 points, C=1 point;
(iii) hlescori: score in the best five Irish Highers obtained (out of 15).
It is a control for ability. It is computed as hlescore;
(iv) abiol*: dummies for the score obtained in the A-level in biology.
23This variable and the scoring system reported below is that commonly applied by the Universities
and Colleges Admission Service (UCAS) for the UK.
24‘Advanced Supplementary’ level examinations, often taken by students from abroad as a way to
meet entry requirements.
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There are five possible outcomes: A, B, C, D, E. It is included as a
measure of aptitude (the quality of the matching with the subject) and
of starting knowledge relevant to the study of LS. Students who took
and obtained good marks in the A-level or Higher in biology are likely to
have a special aptitude towards the study of life sciences and surely some
previous knowledge of specific subjects, which may be a prerequisite to
further study (see for example Altony 1993);
(v) alchem*: dummies for the score obtained in the A-level in chem-
istry. There are five possible outcomes: A, B, C, D, E;
(vi) alphys*: dummies for the score obtained in the A-level in physics.
There are five possible outcomes: A, B, C, D, E;
(vii) almath*: dummies for the score obtained in the A-level in math-
ematics. There are five possible outcomes: A, B, C, D, E;
(viii) hbiol*: dummies for the score obtained in the Scottish or Irish
Higher in biology. There are three possible outcomes: A, B, C;
(ix) hchem*: dummies for the score obtained in the Scottish or Irish
Higher in chemistry. There are three possible outcomes: A, B, C;
(x) hphys*: dummies for the score obtained in the Scottish or Irish
Higher in physics. There are three possible outcomes: A, B, C;
(xi) hmath*: dummies for the score obtained in the Scottish or Irish
Higher in mathematics. There are three possible outcomes: A, B, C.
Past performance in specific subjects can be important for many rea-
sons. Firstly, to assess the relevance of the knowledge of specific subjects
to the study of life sciences. Secondly, because the score in subjects like
mathematics or physics may be interpreted as a measure of quantitative
ability25. Finally, admission officers may consider not only the total A-
levels or Highers score, but also the type and quality of prior educational
qualifications. In this case including the above covariates will help to
alleviate the problem of non-random selection of students into different
universities and to have consistent estimates of university effects.
25Smith & Naylor (2000) for example find that students who previously studied mathematics,
chemistry and physics have a better degree performance.
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(xii) other entry qualifications dummies are included to assess if stu-
dents with non traditional prior qualifications have a disadvantage with
respect to entrants with A-levels or Highers. Hoskins et al. (1997) and
McNabb et al. (1998) found for example that mature students with
non-traditional qualifications perform relatively well in higher education.
They are useful also to alleviate the non-random assignment of non tradi-
tional students across universities (implicitly students with A-level qual-
ifications but who did not take any of the subjects biology, chemistry,
mathematics and physics are the base group).
(xiii) type and quality of secondary school attended. Department
for Education and Employment (DfEE) data on secondary schools was
matched with the USR data (see Smith and Naylor 2000). We include
these variables mainly as controls for the admission policies adopted by
different universities which may prefer students coming from schools with
different levels of selectivity or ‘quality’ (comprehensive admission state
sector Local Authority school is the reference group).
Family and social background
Social Class. The USR data set has information on parental occupa-
tion, which is mapped into a social class variable. There are nine possible
social classes (dummies): professional, intermediate, skilled non manual,
skilled manual, partly skilled, unskilled, armed forces, inadequately de-
scribed, non-workers. There are different rationales for the inclusion of
the social class variable. Social class may be a primary determinant of
the student effort proxying the tightness of the budget constraint, but
also the expected return to education (social networking). It is also a
control for the non-random assignment of students with different social
backgrounds to universities (intermediate social class is the base group).
Prior residence. We include some dummies for the region of prior
residence of students (at the county level for UK students, students from
abroad are aggregated into a single class). Several reasons can be provided
for the inclusion of this variable. If the labour market is not a nation-
wide but a mainly local labour market individuals may have different
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levels of study effort according to the expected local economic return to
educational performance (depending on the interaction between supply
and demand of specific kinds of human capital). Moreover, it may pick
up the effect of the catchment area of the university and alleviate therefore
the selection problem26 (Warwickshire is the control group).
5 Inter-university comparisons
Before describing the results of the analysis it is useful to describe the
data.
From the original sample of 1993 life sciences university leavers, we
exclude students not aiming at a (first) degree level qualification and
students who left university for non-academic reasons. In this selected
sample of 8229 students we consider only full-time students enrolled in
a 3-year or longer undergraduate life sciences course27. The final sample
includes 7997 individuals.
Table 1 reports the percentage of students by degree class for the ‘old’
universities. Universities are anonimised following the recommendation
of the PISG (HEFCE 1999). The average across all universities in the
proportion of Firsts awarded is 8.62 per cent, but there is substantial
variation across universities with university 11 awarding a remarkable
38.27 per cent of Firsts and university 45 not awarding Firsts. The same
variation is present in the proportion of ‘good’ degrees awarded where
the average gap from the best performing university (11) is 33 percent-
age points. The standard deviation in the proportion of ‘good’ degrees
awarded is about 11.
26Collier & Mayer (1986), for example, found that the area of the country from which the applicants
come matters in determining the likelihood of being accepted at Oxford University.
27For part-time students the effect of the covariates included on the RHS of the educational pro-
duction function, especially of those determining study effort, is likely to be different from that of
full-time students, since they have a tighter time constraint, generally working full-time. For these
individuals, 178, study can not be considered as the main activity. Moreover also the PIs developed
by the PISG, which may provide in future a term of comparison, focus on full-time undergraduate
students. As a consequence of this choice we have to drop one university which remains with only
one student, which does not allow the computation of the university effect.
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These differences in degree results can be interpreted as a measure
of the effectiveness of the teaching process (i.e. ‘value added’) only if
students are randomly assigned to universities. Unfortunately, table 2,
reporting the distribution of students per institution by social class and
average A-level score per A-level entrant, shows that this is hardly the
case. As to the two universities mentioned above, university 11 turns out
to have the highest percentage of students coming from the professional
social class across all universities, 38.3 per cent, and the highest average
A-level score per A-level entrant (29 points), whereas for university 45
the corresponding figures are 11.15 per cent and 19 points respectively,
with a remarkable 23.1 per cent of students coming from the ‘non-worker’
social class.
If we want to compare ‘like-with-like’ we need to take account of dif-
ferences in students’ characteristics across universities. This is done by
estimating an ordered probit including university dummies, picking up
effects operating at the institutional level (which by assumption are com-
mon to all students enrolled at a specific university), and the range of
controls listed in the previous section. The list of the estimated univer-
sity effects along with their t-values are reported in table 3. The model
correctly predicts the degree class of about 49% of students. Several uni-
versity effects turn out to be significant at the 10% level (34 on 51 included
and 29 at the 5% level), showing the existence of genuine differences be-
tween universities in the proportion of the different degree classes awarded
which can not be accounted for by differences in the student intake. The
coefficients of the ordered probit are difficult to interpret: a positive sign
of the university effect means that students enrolled at that university
are more likely to obtain a First and less likely to fail with respect to the
reference institution (the reverse for a negative sign) while nothing can
be said for intermediate degree classes.
Since the main focus of the paper is on the investigation of the dif-
ferences in students’ degree performance between higher education in-
stitutions, we omit here a complete description of the effects of all the
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covariates included28. Significant regressors and the sign of the estimated
effects are similar to those found in previous studies29. However, it may be
important to underline that the type and the quality of previous A-level
(Higher) qualifications, which have been often omitted in previous stud-
ies, are highly significant in the explanation of degree performance. In
particular we find that an ‘A’ or a ‘B’ in the A-level in biology significantly
raises the academic performance of life sciences students, the premia in
the probability of a ‘good’ with respect to the reference individual are
about 0.094 and 0.05 respectively. As already said this variable is a mea-
sure of the goodness of the match between a student and a subject and of
her prior knowledge of the subject. Students who took an A-level in biol-
ogy with poor results may not have a special aptitude towards the study
of life sciences. Only an ‘A’ in the A-level in chemistry raises the perfor-
mance (+0.067 in the probability of a ‘good’ degree) while an ‘E’ in the
same subject reduces the performance (-0.067) with respect to students
with an A-level different from biology, chemistry, physics and mathemat-
ics (the reference group). Finally an ‘A’ or a ‘B’ in mathematics and an
‘A’ in physics seems to raise the performance in life sciences courses (with
probability premia of 0.093, 0.036, 0.075 points respectively). These mea-
sures can be considered as measures of quantitative ability. The effect of
an ‘A’ in a previous A-level taken in the set of disciplines considered on
the degree performance in life sciences can be ordered from the biggest
to the lowest: biology, mathematics, physics, chemistry. Similar effects
are found only for ‘A’ and ‘B’ marks for the Higher in chemistry (with
probability premia of 0.084 and 0.039 respectively with respect to the
Higher entrant with average Higher score). The high significant impact
of the type and the score obtained in specific A-levels or Highers sug-
gests that educational performance functions omitting quality of previous
educational outcomes split by subject are likely to be misspecified.
28These are available on request from the author. A likelihood ratio test for the full model against
the model including the intercept only gives a value of 1910.04 distributed as a χ2(175). The pseudo
R2 is 9.12%.
29For example gender and social class are two important predictor of degree performance.
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In order to compare the performance of universities across the full
spectrum of degree classes we compute the predicted probabilities of the
different degree classes for the reference individual. This procedure par-
tials out the effect of the particular composition of the student intake
and provides the expected proportion of different degree classes that would
be awarded if the student intake is homogeneous across universities and
equal to the reference group30. The results are shown in table 4. The
distance between universities strongly reduces: for universities with sig-
nificant effects31 (i.e. statistically significant differences from the base
category university 11) the maximum gap from the best performing uni-
versity (in terms of the proportion of ‘good degrees’ awarded, i.e. again
the reference category university 11) falls from about 58 percentage points
to 24 percentage points while the minimum gap falls from 15 percentage
points to -7.4 points. Therefore the use of ‘raw league tables’ based on de-
scriptive statistics is likely to overestimate the distance existing between
universities and in same cases to change also the relative position of some
institutions.
The marginal effects of universities on students’ degree performance
computed by using the characteristics of the reference individual can be
considered as a measure of ‘theoretical value-added’ (v.a. 1), the ‘value-
added’ that would be produced if all universities have the same student
intake. It is, therefore, an abstract measure of ‘value-added’, since it
is unlikely that we observe the same student intake in different univer-
sities (due to the characteristics of the selection process) and it is sen-
30I.e. a single female student less than 24 years old of the intermediate social class, coming from
Warwickshire, who did not live at parental home and did not transfer for the full duration of the
course, attended a LEA comprehensive admission school, with A-levels but not in biology, chemistry,
mathematics or physics.
31We compare only universities for which the university effect is significant at least at the 10% level.
The other universities do not show statistically significant differences from university 11.
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sitive to the attributes of the reference individual32. The same is true
if the marginal effects are computed at the mean of the sample33. For
this reason it may be interesting to consider another measure of ‘value-
added’ which accounts for the specific composition of the student intake
by university. For each university we compute the difference between the
average expected probability of a ‘good’ degree calculated for its specific
student intake and that obtained with the same student intake enrolled
at the reference university. This measure, unlike the previous one, takes
into account differences in the student intake across universities also for
the calculation of marginal effects which are computed with the specific
student intake of the university of interest. It can be considered as a mea-
sure of differential ‘real value-added’ (v.a. 2) with respect to the reference
university. The results are reported in table 4.
Similarly to Smith et al. (2000) the marginal effect of the university
dummies can be used to rank departments. Figure 1 shows a cross-plot
between the unadjusted ranking, i.e. the ranking based on the proportion
of ‘good’ degrees awarded, and the adjusted ranking obtained using the
‘theoretical value-added’, i.e. v.a. 1. There is a substantial amount of
dispersion across the 45-degree line. The most evident cases are university
31 that falls from the third to the 33rd position and university 40 rising
from the 28th to the third position (see table 4). Our results confirm
32The marginal effect for a dummy variable, e.g. the university effect Ij , in the ordered probit
model P ∗s = αIj + β′Xs + s, where P ∗s is the latent variable, is:
∂Prob[Ps = i]
∂Ij
= [φ(−α− β′Xs)− φ(µk − α− β′Xs)]− [φ(−β′Xs)− φ(µk − β′Xs)]
where s and j are the usual subscripts for students and institutions respectively, Ps is the ordered
qualitative variable (in our case degree class), φ(.) is the standard normal density function, Xs is the
vector of student characteristics and β the relative vector of coefficients, α is the estimated university
effect, i the outcome of interest and µk the appropriate estimated cut-point. It is evident that because
of the shape of the normal distribution the marginal effect is sensitive to the particular point of the
distribution in which it is computed (i.e. to β′Xs).
33In this regard we would like to observe that since the characteristics of the reference individual are
all aggregated in the intercept, the simple computation of the marginal effects of university dummies
at the mean for all variables, among which the other dummies included, does not give the marginal
effect at the mean characteristics of the sample. To compute this measure it is necessary to recover
from the intercept the effect of the single characteristics of the reference group (see Suits, 1994).
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that of Smith et al. (2000): ‘naive’ university league tables may be mis-
leading not only when they are used as PIs of graduate employability but
also when they are employed for inter-university comparisons of students’
academic performance. Similar results are obtained comparing the unad-
justed ranking with the ranking derived from the second measure of ‘value
added’ introduced, i.e. v.a. 2 (see figure 2). Figure 3 shows that despite
the high correlation between the two adjusted measures of ‘value-added’
there exist some big movers from the 45-degree line suggesting that the
ranking of some departments may be sensitive to the particular definition
of ‘value-added’ used.
Following the literature on school quality34 it may be interesting to
assess whether differences across universities can be explained by the type
of institutional characteristics which are commonly used in the empirical
work on school quality. This can be done by regressing the university
effects estimated at the first stage on university-level covariates, i.e. by
estimating the following regression which represents the second stage of
our analysis:
Ij = γZj + uj (10)
where the Ij are university effects and Zj are observable university char-
acteristics. We consider departmental measures of student-staff academic
related ratio, the salary per academic related member of staff, as a mea-
sure of ‘quality’ of the staff35, size of the department (total number of
the academic related staff) and the result of the 1992 Research Assess-
ment Exercise, as a measure of research quality which can have some
feedbacks36 into teaching. We consider several categories of expenditure
34See for example Betts (1996) and Dearden, Ferri & Meghir (1997).
35On the grounds that market wages reflect quality (even if it is not clear in what measure this is
the case, see for example Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin 1999).
36It is not clear whether positive or negative. Staff highly committed to research may devote less
time to undergraduate tuition or research excellence may improve teaching effectiveness.
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per student37, this time at the university level38: equipment, amenities,
residences, computers, books, periodicals, other. A proxy for the ‘peer
effect’, the average A-level score per A-level entrant, is included on the
grounds that the performance may be increased by peer competition39.
OLS can not be used because the coefficients estimated at the first stage
are observed with different sampling errors, introducing heteroscedasticity
in the error term. We use the estimator suggested by Hanushek (1974).
Regression results are shown in table 540. Despite the proportion in the
variation explained by the attributes considered is not negligible (38.5%)
only expenditure on residences is significant (and has a negative sign).
Some of the variables have a counterintuitive sign. Both outcomes may
be produced by the presence of multicollinearity in the data, especially for
the different kinds of expenditure at the university level. A computation
of the ‘condition number’ proposed by Belsey, Kuh & Welsch41 (1980)
gives a very high value of 1,788 suggesting that multicollinearity may be
a serious problem of the data. However, it is clear that an high proportion
of the difference across universities is not accounted for by common mea-
sures of quality of education42. These differences, reflecting unobserved
university attributes, are likely to enter the error term in specifications
of the degree performance equation including university-level inputs (in-
stead of university dummies). In this case the error term in equation
(9) becomes es = s + uj, i.e. the errors of all students enrolled at the
same university contain a common component uj. Then, because of the
non-random assignment of students with different observed characteris-
37We follow the suggestion of Murnane, Singer, Willet, Kemple & Olsen (1991:7) as the inclusion of
total expenditures is a ‘sterile’ approach which gives no indication on the components to be increased
to enhance students’ performance.
38Since the detail by department is not available.
39See Robertson & Symons (1996).
40Two universities are excluded from this second stage of the analysis since data at the departmental
level is not available.
41The ratio between the highest and the lowest eigenvalue of the scaled data matrix, see also Greene
(1997:422). Belsey et al. (1980) suggest that when the value exceeds 20 multicollinearity may cause
estimation problems.
42Our findings are similar to those of Bee & Dolton (1985) who analysed differences in degree class
and pass rates across universities using aggregate data.
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tics to universities the error term in the degree performance equation is
likely to be correlated with students’ characteristics producing inconsis-
tent estimates of their effect. However, as observed by Bee & Dolton
(1985) whether these ‘unexplained differences’ are genuine measures of
‘value-added’ or simply arise through arbitrary and inconsistent percon-
ceptions is still an open question. Even though from the point of view of
the students seeking a ‘good’ degree result to find the ‘true’ source of the
differences across higher education institutions in degree classification is
only of minor importance, it becomes essential to government and fund-
ing bodies when these differences are used to build performance indicators
and to ‘rank’ institutions.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we use individual level university data and microeconomet-
ric techniques to develop university performance indicators relating to
students’ learning outcomes. The analysis is applied to a specific subject:
life sciences. The main findings of the paper are:
1. The type and the score in specific A-levels (Highers) turn out to be
highly significant in the explanation of students’ degree performance.
Previous studies that have omitted these covariates are likely to be
misspecified;
2. The ranking of universities obtained using simple ‘league tables’
based on raw descriptive statistics is substantially different from that
obtained using microeconometric techniques which account for the
quality of the student intake;
3. In some cases even using microeconometric techniques the ranking of
departments is sensitive to the particular definition of ‘value-added’
adopted, showing that a clear definition of this concept should be a
priority of the body of research on university performance indicators;
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4. University effects, i.e. the measure of ‘value-added’ estimated, are
only partially explained by measures of educational quality com-
monly used in the empirical work. About 60% of the variance re-
mains unexplained. Since students are not randomly assigned to
universities, this implies that specifications of educational production
functions directly including university-related attributes are likely to
produce inconsistent estimates of the effects of students’ character-
istics.
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Figure 1: Cross-plot between the ‘unadjusted’ ranking and the ranking based on v.a.
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Notes. The figure shows the cross-plot between the ranking of life sciences departments
obtained from the proportion of ‘good’ (first and upper second class honours) degrees
awarded (unadj) and that obtained from the expected probability of a ‘good’ degree
(for the reference individual) obtained from the ordered probit model, i.e. v.a. 1.
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Figure 2: Cross-plot between the ‘unadjusted’ ranking and the ranking based on v.a.
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Notes. The figure shows the cross-plot between the ranking of life sciences departments
obtained from the proportion of ‘good’ (first and upper second class honours) degrees
awarded (unadj) and that obtained for each university from the difference between
the expected probability of a ‘good’ degree computed with its specific student intake
and the same probability computed for the reference university with the same student
intake, i.e. v.a. 2.
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Figure 3: Cross-plot between the two adjusted rankings based on ‘valued-added’
v.
a.
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Notes. The figure shows the cross-plot between the ranking of life sciences departments
obtained from the expected probability of a ‘good’ degree (for the reference individual),
i.e. v.a. 1, and that obtained for each university from the difference between the
expected probability of a ‘good’ degree computed with its specific student intake and
the same probability computed for the reference university with the same student
intake, i.e. v.a. 2.
36
Table 1: Degree classes awarded by university (percentage)
University fail other 2.2+2 2.1 1 good (1+2.1)
1 13.92 6.70 14.95 52.58 11.86 64.43
2 9.14 5.91 17.74 56.99 10.22 67.20
3 2.90 2.07 26.97 58.92 9.13 68.05
4 13.33 1.67 14.17 60.00 10.83 70.83
5 16.10 13.56 28.81 37.29 4.24 41.53
6 20.53 16.32 17.37 39.47 6.32 45.79
7 20.18 9.65 22.81 38.60 8.77 47.37
8 24.00 2.00 20.00 44.00 10.00 54.00
9 13.39 6.30 27.56 42.91 9.84 52.76
10 5.43 1.63 25.00 57.07 10.87 67.93
11 0.00 0.00 11.73 50.00 38.27 88.27
12 4.08 1.02 31.63 56.12 7.14 63.27
13 5.91 2.46 32.02 47.78 11.82 59.61
14 11.25 1.25 18.75 53.75 15.00 68.75
15 12.80 2.40 29.60 46.40 8.80 55.20
16 27.12 10.17 32.20 23.73 6.78 30.51
17 8.88 4.14 36.09 45.56 5.33 50.89
18 16.00 6.00 26.00 40.00 12.00 52.00
19 9.14 4.99 29.64 50.97 5.26 56.23
20 9.20 10.43 38.04 38.65 3.68 42.33
21 12.73 3.03 24.85 53.94 5.45 59.39
22 12.03 5.50 34.02 42.96 5.50 48.45
23 22.22 3.70 28.70 40.74 4.63 45.37
24 19.14 3.70 26.54 42.59 8.02 50.62
25 17.61 9.15 34.51 31.69 7.04 38.73
26 20.09 8.41 34.58 28.97 7.94 36.92
27 2.04 5.44 20.41 61.90 10.20 72.11
28 14.77 6.25 23.86 47.73 7.39 55.11
29 10.37 3.32 27.39 48.96 9.96 58.92
30 12.70 1.64 27.05 50.41 8.20 58.61
31 3.57 2.60 22.73 58.77 12.34 71.10
32 14.14 5.24 26.70 49.74 4.19 53.93
33 9.55 3.82 24.84 52.87 8.92 61.78
34 8.57 5.71 23.81 52.38 9.52 61.90
35 8.75 2.50 45.00 35.00 8.75 43.75
36 8.44 6.67 32.89 42.67 9.33 52.00
37 18.56 6.19 22.68 45.36 7.22 52.58
38 13.48 3.90 35.46 41.49 5.67 47.16
39 8.33 2.31 26.85 58.33 4.17 62.50
40 2.99 7.19 45.51 36.53 7.78 44.31
41 11.22 3.74 16.82 56.07 12.15 68.22
42 8.70 2.17 23.91 52.17 13.04 65.22
43 10.67 0.00 16.00 61.33 12.00 73.33
44 24.00 2.67 20.00 49.33 4.00 53.33
45 11.54 0.00 23.08 65.38 0.00 65.38
46 17.78 0.00 22.22 55.56 4.44 60.00
47 13.51 2.70 35.14 39.19 9.46 48.65
48 0.87 6.96 39.13 47.83 5.22 53.04
49 6.25 12.50 41.67 33.33 6.25 39.58
50 7.84 3.27 37.25 43.14 8.50 51.63
51 10.14 2.30 28.57 53.00 5.99 58.99
52 21.47 0.56 25.42 44.07 8.47 52.54
Notes. 1: First class honours degree; 2.1: Upper Second class honours degree; 2.2+2:
Lower Second class honours and Undivided Second class honours degrees; other: other
degree classifications; fail: failure in the final year or drop-out for academic reasons.
Universities are anonimised following the recommendation of the PISG (HEFCE
1999).
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Table 2: Distribution of students by social class and average A-level score per A-level
entrant
University I II IIIN IIIM IV V A.F. i.d. N.W. A-l. score
1 15.5 37.6 12.4 8.8 6.7 1.5 1.5 3.1 12.89 17
2 24.2 38.7 8.6 7.5 4.8 1.6 0.5 3.8 10.22 23
3 20.3 31.5 11.6 11.6 10.4 0.4 0.8 2.9 10.37 20
4 31.7 34.2 4.2 10.0 5.8 0.8 0.0 2.5 10.83 21
5 17.8 33.9 11.9 7.6 11.0 1.7 0.0 4.2 11.86 19
6 10.5 28.4 6.3 12.6 8.9 2.1 0.0 3.7 27.37 17
7 20.2 29.8 10.5 15.8 5.3 1.8 0.0 4.4 12.28 17
8 18.0 40.0 8.0 14.0 8.0 2.0 0.0 6.0 4.00 15
9 22.4 34.3 10.6 13.8 6.7 1.6 1.2 2.4 7.09 22
10 26.6 46.2 11.4 6.5 2.2 0.5 0.5 2.7 3.26 25
11 38.3 45.1 8.6 4.3 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.62 29
12 17.3 58.2 8.2 6.1 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.10 25
13 21.7 34.0 10.8 10.3 9.4 1.5 2.5 2.5 7.39 22
14 18.8 36.3 15.0 11.3 5.0 1.3 0.0 5.0 7.50 21
15 20.0 37.6 10.4 13.6 9.6 0.8 0.8 3.2 4.00 21
16 20.3 28.8 8.5 11.9 13.6 0.0 0.0 1.7 15.25 15
17 15.4 42.6 12.4 11.2 5.3 1.8 0.6 3.6 7.10 19
18 18.0 40.0 12.0 12.0 6.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.00 18
19 18.6 38.2 11.6 11.4 10.5 0.8 0.8 1.7 6.37 21
20 13.5 32.5 12.3 18.4 8.0 0.0 0.6 4.9 9.82 20
21 12.7 34.5 16.4 12.1 8.5 0.6 2.4 3.6 9.09 20
22 15.1 36.8 8.6 17.2 7.6 1.7 1.7 2.1 9.28 21
23 12.0 35.2 7.4 10.2 8.3 0.9 0.9 1.9 23.15 16
24 19.8 42.6 9.9 5.6 8.6 0.6 0.0 4.3 8.64 21
25 16.9 32.4 12.7 8.5 7.0 2.8 1.4 2.8 15.49 18
26 20.1 40.7 8.9 9.8 8.4 0.9 0.9 4.2 6.07 14
27 22.4 44.9 11.6 4.1 2.7 1.4 1.4 3.4 8.16 20
28 19.9 41.5 9.7 5.1 7.4 0.6 0.6 3.4 11.93 18
29 20.7 42.7 11.2 8.3 6.6 0.8 1.2 1.2 7.05 24
30 17.2 42.6 9.4 10.7 7.0 1.6 0.8 2.5 8.20 23
31 29.9 51.6 5.5 2.3 3.9 0.0 1.3 1.9 3.57 27
32 19.9 33.5 9.9 6.8 9.4 0.5 0.0 3.7 16.23 18
33 19.1 36.9 15.3 10.2 5.1 0.0 1.3 1.3 10.83 22
34 18.1 41.0 11.4 14.3 5.7 1.0 1.9 2.9 3.81 22
35 18.8 32.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 2.5 1.3 2.5 5.00 18
36 13.3 45.8 10.7 8.9 6.2 0.0 0.4 3.6 11.11 18
37 16.5 30.9 10.3 16.5 9.3 0.0 1.0 6.2 9.28 16
38 12.1 30.9 13.8 13.1 7.8 1.8 0.7 3.9 15.96 16
39 16.7 37.0 11.6 10.2 5.1 1.4 1.9 2.8 13.43 18
40 12.6 37.7 12.0 10.2 12.6 2.4 0.6 4.2 7.78 18
41 19.6 30.8 14.0 15.9 10.3 0.0 0.9 0.9 7.48 19
42 13.0 32.6 26.1 8.7 6.5 0.0 0.0 4.3 8.70 21
43 14.7 42.7 13.3 10.7 6.7 0.0 1.3 1.3 9.33 24
44 10.7 37.3 8.0 9.3 12.0 1.3 1.3 5.3 14.67 19
45 11.5 34.6 11.5 7.7 3.8 0.0 0.0 7.7 23.08 20
46 15.6 42.2 2.2 24.4 2.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 11.11 19
47 9.5 33.8 5.4 16.2 5.4 2.7 0.0 4.1 22.97 15
48 17.4 40.9 17.4 13.0 3.5 0.9 0.0 1.7 5.22 21
49 14.6 39.6 10.4 10.4 8.3 0.0 0.0 2.1 14.58 20
50 16.3 47.7 9.2 11.1 5.9 0.0 1.3 2.0 6.54 23
51 8.3 36.9 6.0 18.0 8.8 0.9 0.5 9.7 11.06 18
52 4.0 26.6 7.3 14.1 7.9 4.5 0.0 3.4 32.20 15
Notes. I: professional occupations; II: managerial and technical occupations; IIIN:
skilled occupations - non manual; IIIM: skilled occupations - manual; IV: partly
skilled; V: unskilled occupations; A.F.: armed forces; i.d.: inadequately described;
N.W.: non-workers; A-l. score: average A-level score per A-level entrant.
38
Table 3: Universities’ dummies
University Coefficient t-value
1 0.15 1.08
2 -0.14 -1.00
3 0.24 1.76
4 0.11 0.71
5 -0.33 -2.20
6 -0.29 -1.96
7 -0.20 -1.33
8 -0.03 -0.15
9 -0.48 -3.82
10 -0.42 -3.19
11 base base
12 -0.42 -2.77
13 -0.21 -1.59
14 -0.08 -0.49
15 -0.42 -2.90
16 -0.64 -3.55
17 -0.27 -1.97
18 -0.30 -1.57
19 -0.33 -2.70
20 -0.51 -3.71
21 -0.37 -2.65
22 -0.42 -3.36
23 -0.46 -3.04
24 -0.64 -4.66
25 -0.51 -3.61
26 -0.46 -3.50
27 0.02 0.16
28 -0.33 -2.41
29 -0.45 -3.59
30 -0.47 -3.75
31 -0.55 -4.79
32 -0.28 -2.10
33 -0.24 -1.75
34 -0.33 -2.16
35 -0.35 -2.16
36 -0.28 -2.16
37 -0.31 -2.00
38 -0.19 -1.51
39 -0.07 -0.55
40 -0.23 -1.65
41 -0.04 -0.26
42 -0.20 -1.02
43 -0.30 -1.80
44 -0.44 -2.60
45 -0.23 -0.92
46 -0.38 -1.90
47 -0.02 -0.14
48 -0.37 -2.55
49 -0.47 -2.45
50 -0.48 -3.43
51 0.25 1.57
52 0.17 1.10
Notes. This table shows the estimated universities’ dummies from the ordered probit
model.
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Table 4: Expected probabilites, ‘value-added’ and ranking of life sciences departments
University Expected probability Value Added Ranking
fail other 2.2+ 2 2.1 1 v.a. 1 v.a. 2 Unadj v.a. 1 v.a. 2
3 1.84 1.54 16.06 61.22 19.34 80.56 8.33 4 1 1
5 6.55 4.01 28.25 53.74 7.45 61.19 -11.80 31 14 14
6 5.99 3.76 27.33 54.80 8.11 62.91 -10.16 26 8 9
9 8.68 4.87 31.09 49.80 5.56 55.37 -16.10 19 30 28
10 7.71 4.49 29.91 51.57 6.32 57.89 -12.34 5 19 16
11 3.26 2.40 21.17 59.81 13.36 73.17 0 1 2 2
12 7.78 4.52 30.00 51.44 6.26 57.70 -13.35 6 22 19
15 7.73 4.50 29.94 51.53 6.31 57.84 -14.46 14 20 22
16 11.43 5.83 33.62 45.11 4.01 49.12 -21.86 35 35 35
17 5.79 3.68 26.99 55.18 8.36 63.55 -9.67 23 5 6
19 6.48 3.98 28.14 53.88 7.53 61.41 -11.10 13 12 12
20 9.18 5.06 31.64 48.90 5.22 54.12 -18.33 30 32 33
21 6.96 4.18 28.88 52.96 7.02 59.98 -12.40 10 16 17
22 7.73 4.50 29.95 51.52 6.30 57.82 -14.74 25 21 24
23 8.40 4.76 30.77 50.31 5.77 56.08 -16.76 27 26 30
24 11.39 5.81 33.59 45.18 4.03 49.21 -21.65 24 34 34
25 9.11 5.03 31.56 49.03 5.27 54.30 -17.90 33 31 32
26 8.37 4.75 30.73 50.36 5.79 56.15 -16.87 34 25 31
28 6.48 3.98 28.15 53.86 7.52 61.39 -11.63 15 13 13
29 8.23 4.70 30.57 50.60 5.89 56.50 -14.48 11 24 23
30 8.50 4.80 30.88 50.13 5.70 55.82 -15.07 12 28 25
31 9.76 5.26 32.21 47.90 4.87 52.76 -14.43 3 33 21
32 5.91 3.73 27.19 54.96 8.21 63.17 -9.89 16 7 8
33 5.46 3.52 26.37 55.82 8.82 64.64 -7.83 8 4 3
34 6.47 3.97 28.12 53.90 7.54 61.44 -10.62 7 11 10
35 6.80 4.12 28.64 53.26 7.18 60.43 -12.14 29 15 15
36 5.90 3.72 27.18 54.97 8.22 63.20 -9.77 21 6 7
37 6.29 3.90 27.83 54.24 7.75 61.99 -11.08 20 10 11
40 5.29 3.44 26.05 56.14 9.08 65.22 -8.06 28 3 4
43 6.11 3.82 27.54 54.57 7.95 62.52 -8.48 2 9 5
44 7.98 4.60 30.27 51.06 6.09 57.15 -15.10 17 23 26
46 7.15 4.26 29.15 52.61 6.83 59.44 -13.47 9 18 20
48 7.08 4.23 29.05 52.74 6.90 59.64 -12.54 18 17 18
49 8.40 4.76 30.77 50.30 5.77 56.06 -16.22 32 27 29
50 8.56 4.82 30.95 50.02 5.65 55.67 -15.61 22 29 27
Notes. This table shows the estimated expected proportion of students obtaining
various degree classes in different universities (when the student intake equals the
reference individual) derived from the ordered probit model, measures of ‘valued
added’ introduced in section 5 and ranking of departments according to different
criteria: the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded (unadj) and two different measures
of ‘value-added’ (v.a. 1 and v.a., 2 see section 5).
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Table 5: Explanation of universities’ effects
Variable Coefficient t-value
const 0.59 1.14
salpro 0.00 0.07
staﬄs 0.00 1.12
ssrls -0.01 -0.27
eqpro -0.09 -0.66
amenpro 0.33 0.60
residpro -0.20 -2.25
comppro -0.56 -1.04
bookspro -2.18 -1.26
perpro -1.33 -0.85
othpro 0.28 0.71
rae92 -0.13 -1.19
peer 0.00 -0.19
R2 0.3849
Notes. This table shows the estimated coefficients obtained from regressing the uni-
versities’ dummies on measures of ‘quality of education’. Explanatory variables in-
cluded are: const (constant), salary per member of academic staff (salpro), number of
academic staff (staﬄs), student-(academic) staff ratio (ssrls), average A-level score for
A-level entrant (peer), all measured at the department level. Other variables measured
at the university level are expenditure per student on equipment (eqpro), amenities
(amenpro), residences (residpro), computers (comppro), books (bookspro), other (oth-
pro). Finally we included the result of the 1992 Research Assessment Exercise (rae92).
